Cash Poor, Perk Rich! Civil Service Compensation: Incentives, Dissatisfaction, And Costs

Nadeem Ul Haque, Durre Nayab, Omer Siddique and Naseem Faraz
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Nadeem Ul Haque: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics
Omer Siddique: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics
Naseem Faraz: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics

No 2021:8, PIDE Research Report from Pakistan Institute of Development Economics

Abstract: The question of reforming the colonial civil service, and its linked institutions, has been on the agenda since independence. Numerous commissions and efforts have been thwarted. The popular perception remains that there has been a secular decline in civil service efficiency. Most reform efforts focus on grades, performance reviews, and structures of the civil service. The incentive structure which economists think is central to human behaviour is often left out of the reform process. Civil service payment remains mired in its colonial foundations consisting of cash compensation that has not kept pace with inflation and several allowances and physical perks such as houses and cars.

Pages: 86
Date: 2021
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https://file.pide.org.pk/pdf/reports/Civil-Service-Compensation-Report.pdf First Version, 2021 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pid:rrepot:2021:8

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