Union-Firm Bargaining agenda: Right-to manage or Efficient Bargaining?

Luciano Fanti

Discussion Papers from Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy

Abstract: In this paper we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between firms and unions. It is shown that an agreement between p arties on the bargaining agenda may endogenously emerge only on the Efficient Bargaining arrangement, provided that union's power is not too high.

Keywords: Efficient bargaining; Right-to-manage; Cournot duopoly. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J51 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-04-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-lab
Note: ISSN 2039-1854
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pie:dsedps:2014/182

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