Product innovation and two-part tariff vertical contracts
Luciano Fanti and
Luca Gori ()
Discussion Papers from Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
This article studies the effects of R&D investments in product innovation in a game-theoretic two-tier model where an upstream monopolist and downstream duopolists negotiate over the terms of a non-linear two-part tariff vertical contract.
Keywords: Duopoly; Product innovation; Two-part tariffs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta and nep-ino
Note: ISSN 2039-1854
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pie:dsedps:2017/222
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