A product innovation game with managerial delegation
Luciano Fanti and
Luca Gori ()
Discussion Papers from Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
This article revisits the works of Lambertini and Rossini (1998) and Bernhofen and Bernhofen (1999) and also extends the analysis to the effects of product innovation in Cournot and Bertrand duopolies with sales delegation.
Keywords: Duopoly; Product innovation; Sales delegation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 J53 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta and nep-ino
Note: ISSN 2039-1854
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pie:dsedps:2017/223
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