Student Evaluation of Teaching (SET), social influence dynamics, and teachers' choices: An evolutionary model
Pierluigi Sacco and
Discussion Papers from Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
The issue of student evaluation of teachers (SET) has been explored by a large literature across many decades. However, the role of social influence factors in determining teachers' responses to a given incentive and evaluation framework has been left basically unexplored. This paper makes a first attempt in this vein by considering an evolutionary game-theoretic context where teachers face a two-stage process where their rating depends on both students' evaluation of their course and on retrospective students' evaluation of their teaching output in view of students' performance in a related follow-up course. We find that both high effort (difficult course offered) and low effort (easy course effort) outcomes may emerge, and that may either lead to a socially optimal outcome for teachers or not, according to cases. Moreover, there may be a potential conflict between the optimal outcome for students and for teachers. We also consider possible ways to generalize our model in future research.
Keywords: Student evaluation of teachers (SET); teacher effort; teacher motivation; social selection; strategic interaction between teachers. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I21 C73 D79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-edu, nep-evo and nep-ure
Note: ISSN 2039-1854
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pie:dsedps:2017/225
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