Private vs Public incentives: an experiment on motivation crowding and social trust
Caterina Giannetti () and
Discussion Papers from Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
Relying on a threshold public good game, we experimentally investigate the effect of two types of incentives on prosocial behaviours. On the one hand, a private type of incentive targets individuals by reducing their cost of contribution. On the other hand, a public type of incentive targets groups by providing an investment that directly support the achievement of the collective objective (i.e. the threshold in the public good game). Thus, we study how expectations on others determine the impact of incentives on prosocial behaviours and how incentives themselves affect these expectations in turn. We interpret this mutual relation as reflecting an endogenous relation between incentive provision and social trust.
Keywords: Motivation crowding; Social Norms; Incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D04 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
Note: ISSN 2039-1854
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pie:dsedps:2018/240
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Discussion Papers from Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().