EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

An experiment on coordination in a modified stag hunt game

Pietro Guarnieri, Tommaso Luzzati () and Stefano Marchetti

Discussion Papers from Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy

Abstract: The paper experimentally investigates whether adding a dominated strategy changes subjects’ decisions in a stag hunt decision context. Specifically, we run two two-periods treatments where respectively 1) the decision makers firstly face the standard stag-hunt matrix and then the modified three-options matrix and 2) the decision makers firstly face the modified three-options matrix and then the standard two-options stag-hunt matrix. Given the circumstance that the added strategy is dominated, standard rationality assumption would predict no changes in participants decisions across periods and treatments. On the contrary, our results show that the exposure to one or the other treatment frames the decision-situation in a different way. Decision makers become less propense to take the risk of "hunting stags" in the modified three-options matrix, after they are firstly exposed to the two-options standard stag-hunt matrix. Vice versa, they appear more propense to change their decision towards the payoff dominant quilibrium, when they are firstly exposed to the modified three-options matrix and then to the two-options standard stag-hunt matrix.

Keywords: stag hunt; coordination; risk-dominance; risk framing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C72 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-ore
Note: ISSN 2039-1854
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.ec.unipi.it/documents/Ricerca/papers/2019-246.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pie:dsedps:2019/246

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2020-12-03
Handle: RePEc:pie:dsedps:2019/246