R&D innovation with socially responsible firms
Domenico Buccella (),
Luciano Fanti and
Luca Gori ()
Discussion Papers from Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
This work revisits the R&D model à la D’Aspremont –Jacquemin (1988) (AJ) in a context with socially responsible firms. In the traditional model firms invest but, in equilibrium, they are cast into a prisoner’s dilemma. Socially responsible firms also invest in equilibrium. However, provided that firms consider sufficiently high consumer welfare, to invest is firms’ utility-enhancing: the prisoner’s dilemma vanishes, and the R&D investment is the firms’ Pareto-efficient choice. That is, while in the traditional AJ context to invest in R&D is Pareto-inferior for the whole society, when firms are of CSR type their R&D innovation becomes a Pareto-superior choice.
Keywords: Process innovation; Corporate social reponsibility; Nash equilibrium; Social welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cse, nep-gth, nep-ino, nep-mic, nep-sbm and nep-upt
Note: ISSN 2039-1854
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pie:dsedps:2021/282
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