Existence of trembling hand equilibrium in revision games with imperfect information
No 5874, Working Paper from Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh
In revision games a group of players can move at stochastic opportunities before adeadline. Their payoffs are determined by the sequence of actions taken before the endof the game. In this paper I define trembling hand equilibrium in a large class of revisiongames that may feature incomplete and imperfect information, and show that tremblinghand equilibria exist. Since trembling hand perfect equilibria are also Nash, existence ofa Nash equilibrium follows.
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