Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage
Richard Van Weelden ()
No 6326, Working Paper from Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh
We study dynamic models of electoral accountability. Politiciansâ€™ policy preferences are their private information, so officeholders act to influence the electorateâ€™s beliefsâ€”i.e., to build reputationâ€”and improve their re-election prospects. The resulting behavior may be socially desirable (â€œgood reputation effectsâ€ ) or undesirable (â€œbad reputation effectsâ€ ). When newly-elected officeholders face stronger reputation pressures than their established counterparts, good reputation effects give rise to incumbency disadvantage while bad reputation effects induce incumbency advantage, all else equal. We relate these results to empirical patterns on incumbency effects across democracies.
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Journal Article: Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pit:wpaper:6326
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