Existence of Trembling hand perfect and sequential equilibrium in Stochastic Games
No 6837, Working Paper from Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh
In this paper we define notions of trembling hand and sequential equilibrium and show that both types of equilibria exist in a large class of stochastic games that may feature incomplete and imperfect information. These equilibria do not necessitate the use of a public correlating device. Under further regularity assumptions each stochastic game has a sequence of approximating finite games whose equilibria approximate equilibria of the limit game.
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