Proportional power is free from paradoxes

László Kóczy ()

No 806, Working Paper Series from Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management

Abstract: We modify the story behind the Shapley-Shubik power index and apply it to a legislative body. The resulting proportional index may be trivial, but is free from the paradoxical behaviour observable with standard power indices. The widespread use of this index may in fact be the reason for these \paradoxes".

Keywords: a priori voting power; paradox of large size; paradox of new members; paradox of quarrelling members; Gamson's Law. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2008-05, Revised 2008-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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