Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions

Fabien Lange () and László Kóczy ()

No 1002, Working Paper Series from Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management

Abstract: A voting situation is given by a set of voters and the rules of legislation that determine minimal requirements for a group of voters to pass a motion. A priori measures of voting power, such as the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf value, show the influence of the individual players. We used to calculate them by looking at marginal contributions in a simple game consisting of winning and losing coalitions derived from the rules of the legislation. We introduce a new way to calculate these measures directly from the set of minimal winning coalitions. This new approach logically appealing as it writes measures as functions of the rules of the legislation. For certain classes of games that arise naturally in applications the logical shortcut drastically simplifies calculations. The technique generalises directly to all semivalues. Keywords. Shapley-Shubik index, Banzhaf index, semivalue, minimal winning coalition, Möbius transform.

Keywords: Shapley-Shubik index; Banzhaf index; semivalue; minimal winning coalition; Möbius transform. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions (2013)
Working Paper: Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions (2012)
Working Paper: Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions (2012)
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