Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions

László Kóczy ()

No 1401, Working Paper Series from Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management

Abstract: Power indices have been used to evaluate the allocation of power in a wide range of voting situations. While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priori voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. We introduce a model where players can reject certain partnerships in cooperation. For normalised indices strategic rejection may increase power. Our notion of a strategic power index is well de ned if power is measured by an index that takes only minimal winning coalitions into account. Keywords and phrases: quarrelling, rejected coalitions, a priori voting power, power indices, minimal winning coalitions, rational players.

Keywords: Apportionment; voting; elections; Venice Commission; proportionality; lexicographic ordering JEL Codes: C71; D71. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2013-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: Power Indices When Players can Commit to Reject Coalitions (2016)
Working Paper: Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions (2014)
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