Entry Deterrence and Entry Accommodation Strategies of a Multiproduct Firm Regulated with Dynamic Price Cap

Paula Sarmento and Antonio Brandao

CEF.UP Working Papers from Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto

Abstract: In this paper we study the way a multiproduct firm, regulated through a dynamic price cap, can develop a price strategy that uses the regulatory policy to deter entry. We consider a firm that initially operates as a monopolist in two markets but faces potential entry in one of the markets. We conclude that the regulated firm can have the incentive to block the entry. This strategy leads to the reduction of the price in both markets. However, the final effect of the entry deterrence strategy on total consumer surplus is not always positive.

Keywords: price cap regulation; entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L11 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2005-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Entry Deterrence and Entry Accommodation Strategies of a Multiproduct Firm Regulated with Dynamic Price Cap (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:por:cetedp:0502

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