Institutional Investor Activism: Does the Portfolio Management Skill Matter?
Carlos Alves () and
Victor Mendes ()
FEP Working Papers from Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto
Institutional investors are often seen as potential solutions for corporate governance problems and are requested to have a more active role in the monitoring and control of listed companies. In this paper we develop a model that, within a universal banking framework, allows one to conclude that, the greater the capacity of a financial group to generate capital inflows that react to the performance of mutual funds, the more the said attitude is likely to succeed. The paper also concludes that the efforts of supervisory authorities should be directed in particular to the relations between universal financial groups and companies in which these financial groups do not have a relevant stake.
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Institutional Investor Activism; Universal Banking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G10 G21 G28 G30 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-fin and nep-fmk
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:por:fepwps:184
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