A comment on efficiency gains and myopic antitrust authority in a dynamic merger game

Pedro Vieira

FEP Working Papers from Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto

Abstract: This paper relaxes the Motta & Vasconcelos’ (2005) short-term assumption that firms’ capital is fixed. We demonstrate that, contrary to the conclusion of that article, in the best interest of consumers, even when firms have large economies of scale, long-term forward-looking Antitrust Authorities must block firms’ merger plans whenever profits of firms are positive.

Keywords: Antitrust policy; Economies of scale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L25 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 5 pages
Date: 2008-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:por:fepwps:289

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