Agreeing to Disagree with Multiple Priors

Andrés Carvajal and Joao Correia-da-Silva

FEP Working Papers from Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto

Abstract: We present an extension of Aumann's Agreement Theorem to the case of multiple priors. If agents update all their priors, then, for the Agreement Theorem to hold, it is sufficient to assume that they have closed, connected and intersecting sets of priors. On the other hand, if agents select the priors to be updated according to the maximum likelihood criterion, then, under these same assumptions, agents may still agree to disagree. For the Agreement Theorem to hold, it is also necessary to assume that the maximum likelihood priors are commonly known and not disjoint. To show that these hypotheses are necessary, we give several examples in which agents agree to disagree.

Keywords: Agreeing to disagree; multiple priors; Aumann's Agreement Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2010-04
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:por:fepwps:368

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