Bargaining Structure and Regional Unemployment Insurance

Helge Sanner

No 44, Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge from Universität Potsdam, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät

Abstract: This study examines how the size of trade unions relative to the labor force impacts on the desirability of different organizational forms of self- financing unemployment insurance (UI) for workers, firms, and with reference to an efficiency criterion. For this purpose, we respectively numerically compare the outcome of a model with a uniform payroll tax to a model where workers pay taxes according to their systematic risk of unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of the bargaining structure for the assessment of a particular UI scheme. Most importantly, it depends on the size of the unions whether effciency favors a uniform or a differentiated UI scheme.

Keywords: Unemployment Insurance; Wage bargaining theory; Union size (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 J51 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001, Revised 2002-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Labour, Vol. 17.2 (2003), pp. 229-246 (revised version)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Self‐financing Unemployment Insurance and Bargaining Structure (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pot:vwldis:44

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