Game-Theoretic Accounts of Social Norms. The Role of Normative Expectations
Cristina Bicchieri and
No 11, PPE Working Papers from Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania
This is a draft of a chapter in a planned book on behavioral game theory. Social norms and social preferences have increasingly become an integral part of the economics discourse. After disentangling the two notions, this paper focuses on social norms, which we stipulate as group-specific solutions to strategic problems. More precisely, we define social norms as behavioral regularities emerging in mixed-motive games, as a result of preferences for conformity conditional on an endogenous set of beliefs and expectations. To that end, we review models that explicitly feature normative expectations, as well as models that account for category-specific prescriptions. We finally survey some relevant experimental evidence.
Keywords: social norms; social preferences; social dilemmas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ppc:wpaper:0011
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