ON THE ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF PROSTITUTION: MARRIAGE COMPENSATION AND UNILATERAL DIVORCE IN U.S. STATES

Riccardo Ciacci

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper studies the hypothesis that marriage opportunities are an economic determinant of female prostitution. I exploit differences in the timing of entry into force of unilateral divorce laws across U.S. states to explore the effect of such laws on female prostitution (proxied by arrests of female prostitutes). Using a difference-indifference estimation approach, I find that unilateral divorce reduces prostitution by 10%. My results suggest that unilateral divorce improves the option value of marriage by increasing wives’ welfare. As a result, the opportunity cost of becoming a female prostitute increases and the supply of prostitution declines.

Keywords: Prostitution; unilateral divorce; difference-in-difference; marriage compensation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J12 J16 K14 K36 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-12-12, Revised 2020-03-14
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:100392

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