The political economy theorem

Alessandro Saccal

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Welfare maximisation is constrained by the ultimate frontier of efficient allocations, with a unique, interior optimum. By the second welfare theorem, such an optimum depends on a specific wealth distribution out of innumerable ones at given prices, whereby the state cannot refrain from redistributing. Such has long been known by the profession, but it never received a mathematical formalisation, which this article takes up. Building on the literature, this research also presents two simplified proofs to the two welfare theorems and a mathematical formalisation of the resolution to the compromise between equity and efficiency, for the additional constraint binds the social welfare function in equity and it originates the ultimate possibility frontier in efficiency.

Keywords: competitive equilibrium; Pareto efficiency; political economy; social welfare; utility possibility; wealth distribution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D51 D61 D63 I31 I38 P46 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-02-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/101037/1/MPRA_paper_101037.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/109750/1/MPRA_paper_109750.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY THEOREM (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:101037

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