Confessions of an Internet Monopolist: Demand Estimation for a Versioned Information Good

Henry Chappell, Paulo Guimaraes and Orgul Ozturk

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We investigate profit-maximizing versioning plans for an information goods monopolist. The analysis employs data obtained from a web-based field experiment in which potential buyers were offered information goods in varied price-quality configurations. Maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) methods are used to estimate parameters describing the distribution of utility function parameters across potential buyers of the good. The resulting estimates are used to examine the impact of versioning on seller profits and market efficiency.

Keywords: Versioning; price discrimination; field experiment; maximum simulated likelihood (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C81 C93 D12 D42 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006, Revised 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ict, nep-mic and nep-mkt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:10106

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