Tools and approaches in public contracting research

Marian Moszoro

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: What makes contracting in public organizations different from contracting in private organizations? This essay explores advances in research at the intersection of contract theory and behavioral political economics. The main challenges consist of identifying and measuring the trade-offs that arise due to the interaction of agents under public oversight and political competition. It highlights theoretical models that address accountability and public managers’ discretionary contractual choices, as well as empirical tools for causal inference in public-private contracting.

Keywords: Procurement; public-private contracting; political economy; causal inference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 L32 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Published in A Research Agenda for New Institutional Economics, edited by Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley. Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham, UK. Chapter 10 (2018): pp. 88-96

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Chapter: Tools and approaches in public contracting research (2018)
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