Price-setting mixed duopoly, subsidization and the order of firms’ moves: an irrelevance result

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper examines price-setting duopoly games with production subsidies and shows that the optimal production subsidy, profits and economic welfare are identical irrespective of whether (i) a public firm and a private firm simultaneously and independently set prices, (ii) the public firm acts as a Stackelberg leader, or (iii) both firms behave as profit-maximizers.

Keywords: Mixed duopoly model; Price competition; Subsidization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D21 L32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-gth and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/105654/1/MPRA_paper_105654.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:102476

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