Licensing with capacity constraint
Stefano Colombo (),
Luigi Filippini () and
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
We consider a patent licensing game with a capacity constrained innovator. We show that when the constraint is strong (weak), the patentee prefers licensing by means of a fixed fee (unit royalty). In the case of a two-part tariff, the innovator charges a positive fixed fee if and only if the constraint is strong enough.
Keywords: Patent licensing; capacity constraint; Cournot duopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D45 L24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind, nep-ino and nep-ipr
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:102653
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