Management compensation design for a banking firm

Bhaskar Sinha

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The extant of indigenous literature on bad loans concentrate to analyze the factors that would increase efficient credit allocation by public sector banks in India.. RBI, the Central Bank in India, has mostly tried to promote priority sector lending through various policy steps. However, the list has only become longer. The paper proposes an incentive contract based on information asymmetry model to approach the problem

Keywords: Bank Incentive contract deign; compensation design; priority sector lending; rewarding effort. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D86 E5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-01, Revised 2020-06
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