Political Contestability and Public Contract Rigidity: An Analysis of Procurement Contracts

Jean Beuve, Marian Moszoro and Stephane Saussier

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Are public contracts less adaptable than private contracts? Using a comprehensive set of contracts for a standard product, we compare procurement contracts in which the procurer is either a public administration or a private corporation. We find that public-to-private contracts feature more rigidity clauses than private-to-private contracts and that the use of rigidity clauses in public contracts rises when political risks are more salient. We argue that a significant part of the increased rigidity of public contracts is a contractual adaptation to limit political hazards from political opponents and interested third parties.

Keywords: Procurement; Political Contestability; Contractual Rigidity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D72 D73 D78 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 2.28(2019): pp. 316-335

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Related works:
Journal Article: Political contestability and public contract rigidity: An analysis of procurement contracts (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:102694

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