Coasean Quality of Regulated Goods

Marian Moszoro

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The quality of goods provided by public utilities depends on infrastructure features and operational inputs. I compare the economic efficiency that results from price ceilings and minimum quality standards (i.e., compliance with environmental, chemical, and performance standards and norms) imposed by a benevolent regulator to a Coasean bargaining solution between a median consumer and a monopolist. When quality is non-excludable and non-rival, rate-of-return regulation yields higher economic efficiency than price cap regulation.

Keywords: Public Goods; Network Infrastructure; Regulation of Quality; Coase Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 H54 L15 L43 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 4.16(2016): pp. 1-13

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Related works:
Journal Article: Coasean Quality of Regulated Goods (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:102699

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