EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Obviously Strategy-proof Implementation of Assignment Rules: A New Characterization

Pinaki Mandal and Souvik Roy

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider assignment problems where individuals are to be assigned at most one indivisible object and monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide a characterization of assignment rules that are Pareto efficient, non-bossy, and implementable in obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms. As corollaries of our result, we obtain a characterization of OSP-implementable fixed priority top trading cycles (FPTTC) rules, hierarchical exchange rules, and trading cycles rules. Troyan (2019) provides a characterization of OSP-implementable FPTTC rules when there are equal number of individuals and objects. Our result generalizes this for arbitrary values of those.

Keywords: Assignment problem; Obvious strategy-proofness; Pareto efficiency; Non-bossiness; Indivisible goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-11-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/104044/1/MPRA_paper_104044.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/108591/1/MPRA_paper_108591.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/108368/1/MPRA_paper_108368.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:104044

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:104044