Do risk and competition trigger conditional cooperative behavior? Evidence from Public good experiment

Angela Bergantino, Andrea Morone and Sara Gil Gallen

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We investigate the effect of intragroup competition and risky marginal per capita returns on subjects' cooperative behavior in a one-shot public good game – following the wellknown approach proposed by Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) and extending the Colasante et al. (2019) and Colasante et al. (2018) parametrization. We are aiming to study the interaction between environment and social preferences and test the existence of a causal relationship of risk and competition over cooperative behavior when an individual’s benefit of the public good is heterogeneous and uncertain. Our results report experimental evidence about competition fostering cooperative behavior leading a raise contribution for all the subjects regardless of their social preferences. On the contrary, risky has a detrimental effect on cooperative behavior due to encouraging free riding.

Keywords: risk; competition; conditional cooperator; marginal per capita return. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D80 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-12-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:104465

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