Recourse, asymmetric information, and credit risk over the business cycle
Mark van der Plaat and
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Recourse is often included in loan sales and securitization in order to reduce potential problems arising from information asymmetries. Recent literature has shown, however, that recourse was ineffective in preventing such problems. In this paper we empirically study the recourse cyclicality hypothesis, which states that recourse is only effective in signaling asset quality and thereby reducing information asymmetries in a recession. Using data between 2001 and 2016 on U.S. commercial banks, we find that recourse is only effective in signaling asset quality during a recession. When the economy is booming, recourse is ineffective and cannot prevent the build-up of risky assets on- and off-balance sheet of banks. Our results are robust to several specifications.
Keywords: Recourse; Loan Sales; Securitization; Asymmetric Information; Adverse Selection; Moral Hazard; Credit Risk; Banking; Cyclicality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cfn and nep-mac
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:104718
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