Conditional Rewarding Behaviour: An Experiment

Artem Nesterov

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Both peer-to-peer punishments and rewards can be effective in increasing cooperation in dilemma situations. We follow Kamei’s experimental design [2014, Economics Letters 124, pp.199-202], except we use a reward option instead of a punishment one. Consistent with Kamei (2014), decisions to reward are on average positively proportional to the others’ reward to the same recipient. We classify the rewarding types in a similar fashion and find fewer anti-social types.

Keywords: experiment; dilemma; cooperation; rewarding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C92 D70 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-12-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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