Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
The analysis of adverse selection problems in seller-buyer relationships has typically been based on the assumption that private information is uncertifiable, while in practice it may well be certifiable. If a buyer has certifiable private information, he can conceal evidence, but he cannot claim to have information for which he has no evidence, so he has fewer possibilities to misrepresent his information. Nevertheless, we find that the expected total surplus can be strictly smaller in the case of certifiable information than in the case of uncertifiable information. This finding holds when the buyer may have private information with some exogenous probability as well as in the case of opportunistic information gathering, where the buyer can privately decide whether or not to acquire information for strategic reasons.
Keywords: Contracting; Asymmetric information; Adverse selection; Screening; Information gathering (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 L24 M11 M4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Journal Article: Contracting under adverse selection: Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information (2021)
Working Paper: Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:105106
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