Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements, and the Case of North Korea

Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this volume, we draw on a growing theoretical and empirical literature on economic statecraft to connect marketization processes, changing foreign economic relations and the strategic interplay around the North Korea’s nuclear program. The ultimate objective is not only to understand North Korea but to address the debate over the merits and demerits of “engagement” with adversaries. However, this manuscript is not simply about North Korea. It also seeks to address the broader theoretical and empirical question of how and whether “engagement” with adversaries—and economic engagement in particular--can mitigate security dilemmas, induce cooperation and even transform recalcitrant states.

Keywords: sanctions; engagement; North Korea; nuclear weapons (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F5 F51 P2 P26 P3 P33 P37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-04-18
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:105812

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