Competition in Signaling
Federico Vaccari
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
I study a multi-sender signaling game between an uninformed decision maker and two senders with common private information and opposed interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that is tied to the size of the misrepresentation. The main results concern the amount of information that is transmitted in equilibrium and the language used by senders to convey such information. Fully revealing and pure strategy equilibria exist but are not plausible. I identify sufficient conditions under which equilibria always exist, are plausible, and essentially unique, and deliver a complete characterization of such equilibria. As an application, I study the informative value of different judicial procedures.
Keywords: signaling; multi-sender; competition; misreporting; communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-02-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/106071/1/MPRA_paper_106071.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Competition in Signaling (2022) 
Working Paper: Competition in Signaling (2022) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:106071
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