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The grand dividends value

Manfred Besner

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We introduce a new value for games with transferable utility, called grand dividends value. In the payoff calculation, the grand dividends value takes into account the worths of all subcoalitions of a player set. The concept of grand dividends, representing the surplus (which can also be non-positive) of the worth of the grand coalition over the worths of all coalitions that lack one player of the player set, is the initial point here. The grand dividends value satisfies many properties that we know from the Shapley value. Along with new axioms that have a similar correspondence to axioms that are also satisfied by the Shapley value, axiomatizations arise that have an analogous equivalent for the Shapley value, including the classics of Shapley and Young.

Keywords: Cooperative game; (Harsanyi/Grand) Dividends; Shapley value; Grand dividends value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-03-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-gth and nep-upt
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