 State monopoly in higher education as a rent seeking industryMichael Mitsopoulos and Theodore Pelagidis MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Abstract: In Greece, the provision of tertiary education is permitted, by the constitution, only to "public" institutions where faculty and administrators are civil servants and public officials respectively. We construct an argument and present statistical data that describe the situation observed in Greece, where the community of higher education providers decides in the name of the whole society on the extent to which the provision of these services is a (state) monopoly. We see that in the context of our argument the society has to override the decision of the educational community regarding the provision of these services if it desires to see the community of educational services providers to allocate more time towards their profession and less time towards rent protection and/or extraction. We argue that once reform, that is the removal of the state monopoly, is introduced the educational community will allocate more effort towards educational related activities and less effort towards rent protection while at the same time it will accept a new "equilibrium" in which education related activities are rewarded more generously. Keywords: Higher Education; Policy Reforms; Rent Seeking; Greece (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:106957 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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