Can Formal Institutions Lead to the Spillover Effect of Cooperation?

Rati Mekvabishvili

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Can formal institutions shape prosocial behavior and lead to the spillover effect of cooperation? To explore this question, we experimentally test the spillover- based theory in a novel context. We measured the spillover effect on cooperation in the same domain measured by the repeated anonymous public goods game. We found strong evidence of altruism. Our results are inconsistent with prediction of the spillover-based theory. Our finding suggests that exposure to strong formal institutions that provide top-down motivation for cooperation substantially improves cooperation in their presence, but do not seem to lead to more prosociality after their absence.

Keywords: Centralized Punishment; Spillover; Public Goods; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D02 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-03-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-law and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Theoretical Economic Letters 11.2(2021): pp. 186-193

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:107047

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