Matchings under Stability, Minimum Regret, and Forced and Forbidden Pairs in Marriage Problem

Pinaki Mandal and Souvik Roy

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We provide a class of algorithms, called men-women proposing deferred acceptance (MWPDA) algorithms, that can produce all stable matchings at every preference profile for the marriage problem. Next, we provide an algorithm that produces a minimum regret stable matching at every preference profile. We also show that its outcome is always women-optimal in the set of all minimum regret stable matchings. Finally, we provide an algorithm that produces a stable matching with given sets of forced and forbidden pairs at every preference profile, whenever such a matching exists. As before, here too we show that the outcome of the said algorithm is women-optimal in the set of all stable matchings with given sets of forced and forbidden pairs.

Keywords: Two-sided matching; Marriage problem; Pairwise stability; Stability; Minimum regret; Forced and forbidden pairs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-04-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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