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Bargaining for Community Fishing Quotas

Elias Asproudis and Eleftherios Filippiadis

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper presents a model based on the Nash bargaining for fishing quotas and wages between fishing communities and vessels, focusing on two cases: (a) the fishing communities are not environmentally conscious and ignore the external damages caused by the fishing industry emissions, and (b) the fishing communities are environmentally conscious, and the external damages caused by the fishing industry emissions affect their bargaining position in the fishing quotas market. Between other it is argued that, in developing economies, where normally the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) is relatively strict compared to the community's needs, the community's degree of environmental awareness has no effect on social welfare. In developed countries the social welfare is higher when the fishing community is environmentally conscious provided a slow decrease in consumption's marginal utility relative to the rate at which the marginal environmental damage increases. Finally, the community's utility and the vessel's profits depend on the strictness of the total allowable catch.

Keywords: bargaining; fishing quotas; environmental protection; fishing community; vessels; social welfare. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 Q13 Q22 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-04-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-gth and nep-upt
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