Stronger Patent Regime, Innovation and Scientist Mobility

Madhuparna Ganguly

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of a stronger patent regime on innovation incentives, patenting propensity and scientist mobility when an innovating firm can partially recover its damage due to scientist movement from the infringing rival. The strength of the patent system, which is a function of litigation success probability and damage recovery proportion, stipulates expected indemnification. We show that stronger patents fail to reduce the likelihood of infringement and further, decrease the innovation's expected profitability. Higher potential reparation also reduces the scientist's expected return on R&D knowledge, entailing greater R&D investment. Our results suggest important considerations for patent reforms.

Keywords: Damage rules; Infringement; Patent strength; Scientist mobility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J60 K40 L13 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-lab, nep-law and nep-tid
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/107635/1/MPRA_paper_107635.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/107734/1/MPRA_paper_107635.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:107635

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().