Bertrand-Edgeworth games under oligopoly with a complete characterization for the triopoly

Massimo De Francesco () and Neri Salvadori

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The paper extends the analysis of price competition among capacity-constrained sellers beyond the cases of duopoly and symmetric oligopoly.We first provide some general results for the oligopoly and then focus on the triopoly, providing a complete characterization of the mixed strategy equilibrium of the price game. The region of the capacity space where the equilibrium is mixed is partitioned according to the features of the mixed strategy equilibrium arising in each subregion. Then computing the mixed strategy equilibrium becomes a quite simple task. The analysis reveals features of the mixed strategy equilibrium which do not arise in the duopoly

Keywords: Bertrand-Edgeworth; Price game; Oligopoly; Triopoly; Mixed strategy equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05-11, Revised 2008-09-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10767/1/MPRA_paper_10767.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24087/1/MPRA_paper_24087.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Bertrand-Edgeworth games under oligopoly with a complete characterization for the triopoly (2008)
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