Oferta laboral familiar y negociación intrafamiliar en España: Un test del modelo colectivo
Household labor supply and intrahousehold bargaining: An empirical test of the collective model
Helena Ibarra and
Jorge Velilla ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
This paper analyzes the intrahousehold bargaining power of spouses in Spanish families, in a collective framework. Using data for Spain, we estimate household labor supply equations and, under certain testable restrictions, we obtain a theoretically-derived a sharing rule for household income, which characterizes intrahousehold bargaining power. Then, using unique data on decision-making in the household, we build up a constructed Pareto weight, and study the validity of the collective model by comparing the theoretical sharing rule and the constructed Pareto weight. The results reveal that both the observed Pareto weight and the theoretical sharing rule display qualitative similarities, thus providing direct empirical support to the collective model. Furthermore, the results suggest that Spanish wives behave more altruistically, while husbands behave more egoistically.
Keywords: Collective model; Labor supply; Intrahousehold bargaining power; Spain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 D10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:108080
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