Existence of pure strategy equilibria in Bertrand-Edgeworth games with imperfect divisibility of money

Massimo De Francesco ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper incorporates imperfect divisibility of money in a price game where a given number of identical firms produce a homogeneous product at constant unit cost up to capacity. We find necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. Unlike in the continuous action space case, under discrete pricing there may be a range of symmetric pure strategy equilibria - which we fully characterize - a range which may or may not include the competitive price. Also, we determine the maximum number of such equilibria when competitive pricing is itself an equilibrium.

Keywords: Bertrand-Edgeworth competition; Price game; Oligopoly; Pure strategy equilibrium; Discrete pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-09-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10826/1/MPRA_paper_10826.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Existence of pure strategy equilibrium in Bertrand-Edgeworth games with imperfect divisibility of money (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:10826

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().