On the reserve price in all-pay auctions with complete information and lobbying games
Paolo Bertoletti ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
We show that the seller’s optimal reserve price in an all-pay auction with complete information is higher than in a standard auction. We use our results to re-consider some findings of the literature that models lobbying games as all-pay auctions. In particular, we show that the so-called Exclusion Principle appears to rely crucially on the implicit assumption of a “weak” (in terms of bargaining power) seller, and does not hold if she regards bidders’ valuations as iid according to a monotonic hazard rate. Our preliminary results for the case of independent but asymmetric bidders make it even more suspicious.
Keywords: all-pay auctions; reserve price; economic theory of lobbying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1083/1/MPRA_paper_1083.pdf original version (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:1083
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().