Mediating Financial Intermediation

Aymeric Bellon, Louis-Marie Harpedanne de Belleville and Noémie Pinardon-Touati

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper studies the resolution of disputes between firms and their lenders through external mediators, who suggest a non-legally binding solution to resolve a disagreement after communicating with all parties. We exploit an administrative database on firms’ outcomes matched to the French credit registry and plausible exogenous variation in eligibility to public mediators across counties for identification. Credit, employment and investment increase following the mediation, causing an overall reduction in firms’ liquidation of 34.6 percentage points. All the effects are driven by firms that borrow from more than one financial institution, supporting the view that mediators solve coordination problems between lenders.

Keywords: Mediation; credit; asymmetric information; coordination of creditors; informal restructuring; financial constraints; debt overhang; bankruptcy; employment; investment; judge instrument; borders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G21 G28 H81 H89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-06-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn and nep-fdg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:108339

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