Disjointly and jointly productive players and the Shapley value

Manfred Besner

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Central to this study is the concept of disjointly productive players. Two players are disjointly productive if there is no synergy effect if one of these players joins a coalition containing the other. Our first new axiom states that the payoff to a player does not change when another player, disjointly productive with that player, leaves the game. The second new axiom means that if we merge two disjointly productive players into a new player, the payoff to a third player does not change. These two axioms, along with efficiency, characterize the Shapley value and may be useful in improving the run time for computing the Shapley value in games with some disjointly productive players. Further axiomatizations of the Shapley value are provided in which jointly productive players, known as mutually dependent players, also play a role. Using a change of behavior property, the payoff for two players in two games in which their behavior changed once to total dislike and once to total like is equal to the payoff in the original game. Another axiomatization uses an additivity property for games in which two players have also changed their behavior to total non-cooperation.

Keywords: Cooperative game; Shapley value; Disjointly productive players; Mutually dependent players; Merged (disjointly productive) players game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-06-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/108511/1/MPRA_paper_108511.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/108653/1/MPRA_paper_108653.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:108511

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().