A Theory of Political Participation

Berk Isa and Mustafa Yücel

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper lays down a mathematical model of political participation where participatory behavior functions as insurance against redistribution of resources. Abstracting a broad notion of political participation to its tangible bene�fits and costs, we elaborate the participatory behavior from the perspectives of Expected Utility and Cumulative Prospect Theory. Our elaboration reveals that the relative degrees of risk aversion and loss aversion yield a multiplicity of equilibria, sheds light on the recently observed absenteeism in political participation and suggest that participation would not increase unless the material domain of politics itself is altered.

Keywords: Political Participation; Cumulative Prospect Theory; Risk Aversion; Insurance; Lobbying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias, nep-mic, nep-pol and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:108818

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