Efficiency wage (and slavery) efficiency: in theory and in time

Alessandro Saccal

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The formal differentiation of (i) pain incentives from ordinary rewards, (ii) of effortful from careful production and (iii) of diligent from slothful workers under labour market imperfect competition ultimately suggests that the optimal menu of contracts associates inducements to production kinds following the preference triggered by slothful workers: effortful production with pain incentives and careful production with ordinary rewards. The efficiency of the efficiency wage as interpreted by the sociological theory is therefore discerned to arise under a particular production kind and so is that of slavery its dual (undoubtedly illicit). More broadly, the confusion of the two production kinds under market and state capitalism respectively contributes to the Phillips curve and price rigidity, in the misapplication of ordinary rewards to effortful production. State capitalism jurisprudentially eliminates the risks of dismissal and redundancy and thereby lastly causes effortful production to enter stagnation.

Keywords: care; diligence; efficiency; effort; pain; production; rewards; scourging; slavery; sloth; wages. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D24 D41 D42 D86 E11 E12 E13 E23 E31 E32 J41 N20 N30 O43 P10 P20 P22 P30 P37 P51 P52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-07-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-isf and nep-mac
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